This tool provides an indication of a fair margin for a deal using basic, non-identifying deal information. It is designed for stakeholders in export finance who need a fair estimate of a deal’s margin. The output can be used as the basis for a business plan, to compare alternative financing solutions, for scenario analysis, and for ECA benchmarking to identify the most cost-efficient option.
The model was developed in collaboration with former senior bankers. It simulates most of the pricing considerations a bank would use, including cost of funding, administrative/KWC costs, risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC), borrower-specific factors (volume, tenor, country, industry, currency), and other market conditions.
The model’s output is conservative. In 50 simulations we observed:
Basic pricing represents the minimum margin that a bank would apply to a deal, taking into account factors such as risk exposure and minimum profitability requirements. It is expressed as a margin over a benchmark rate (SOFR, EURIBOR, etc.).
It is calculated using a combination of variables provided by the user and others gathered from the market. The market-sourced variables are determined through market consultation and do not represent any lending institution in particular, but rather what would be expected from competitive market participants. Some of these variables are revised periodically to reflect market conditions, while others are unlikely to change over time. The variables used and calculation for basic pricing can be found in Annex 1.
One of the main drivers of the basic pricing estimator is the percentage of ECA cover on the deal: as the level of cover decreases, the basic pricing increases. Conversely, where a deal is 100% guaranteed by an OECD ECA, the same basic pricing may be observed across different geographies, as the lender’s risk exposure is to the ECA rather than to the borrower.
In addition to the basic pricing, lenders apply several add-ons to reflect situations that may discourage some lenders from participating in the deal. As a result, banks that are willing to pursue such deals face less competition and may charge higher pricing.
Certain add-ons are related to the nature of the borrower, while others are driven purely by market conditions. For some borrower-related add-ons, we rely on our own data. Consequently, for certain countries or industries, there may be insufficient reference points to establish a robust pricing view. This does not necessarily imply a lack of market appetite for such transactions; rather, it indicates that pricing them may be more challenging due to the limited availability of relevant precedents.
Market-condition add-ons are fixed premiums applied to reflect specific market scenarios that may reduce the attractiveness of a deal for certain lenders. These may include, for example, cases where a significant amount of debt is already concentrated in a given country, or other situations that may constrain lender appetite. These add-ons are expressed in bps and are detailed in Annex 2.
The estimator provides three pricing references: Minimum, Typical, and Maximum. This approach reflects the fact that, in certain market circumstances, all add-ons may be applied, whereas in others lenders may consider only some of them.
The Minimum represents basic pricing plus borrower-related add-ons. The Typical includes, in addition, half of the market-condition add-ons. The Maximum reflects all add-ons applicable to the deal.
The pricing is just the margin, and it does not include fees and the premium that the ECA would charge to insure the deal.
| Parameter | Definition | Type | Review frequency | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Funding spread (F) bps | Bank funding cost. USD/EUR only for banks with a currency strong position | Estimation | Quarterly | Market |
| Opex (O) bps | Operating/service cost (KWC, monitoring, admin...) | Estimation | Quarterly | Market |
| Uncovered share (U) | % of the loan NOT covered by the ECA in % | Parameter | – | User |
| Risk Weight (RW) % (on uncovered)1 | Risk weight of the uncovered part of the loan (from table) | Parameter | Ad hoc | Basel 3.1 |
| k-factor % (capital ratio) | Internal/economic CET1 held per € RWA (currently 10%) | Estimation | Annually | Bank annual reports |
| Target return r % (after-tax) | Required after-tax return on Core Tier Capital (CET1, 12.5%) | Parameter | Annually | Bank annual reports |
| LGD % (on uncovered) | Loss-given-default on the uncovered part. Fixed at 45% for European banks | Estimation | Annually | Market |
| Tax rate (%) | Avg. corporate tax. Fixed at 25% | Parameter | – | Regulators |
| Probability of default (PD) 1-year2 | An estimate of the likelihood that a borrower will default on their debt obligations within the next 12 months (from table) | Parameter | Annually | S&P |
1. Simplified CRR/SA mapping; national discretions and bank/bank-claims options may differ. ECA-eligible guarantees: covered exposure can use guarantor substitution (often 0% RW for sovereign/ECA).
2. Using S&P as 1-year PD proxies for pricing EL under SA. They will be replaced by internal/market specific PDs when available.
Basic pricing (bps) = (F + O) + [U × (PD × LGD)] + [U × [r/(1−tax)] × k × RW]
95% guaranteed loan (5% exposure; U = 0.05) for a BB+ borrower (PD = 0.7%, RW = 100%)
EL per-unit = PD × LGD = 0.007 × 0.45 = 0.0031 → 31.5 bps Capital per-unit = r/(1−tax) × k × RW = 0.125/0.75 × 0.10 × 1 = 0.0166 → 166.7 bps Floor (F+O) = 40 + 10 = 50.00 bps EL component = U × 31.5 = 0.05 × 31.5 = 1.57 bps Capital component = U × 166.7 = 0.05 × 166.7 = 8.33 bps ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Required Margin M = 59.90 bps
| # | Add-on | Description | Penalty range (bps) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lack of appetite due to low volume | Smaller deals tend to cost more due to lack of appetite and loan to deal cost ratio. Some deals might not be even economical. | 0 to +15 |
| 2 | Restrictive/unpopular industry | We check the activity of the industry against our records. Renewables usually receive a bonus. | −10 to +15 |
| 3 | Challenging jurisdiction/country | We check the activity of the country against our records. OECD countries do not penalise despite lack of deals. | 0–15 |
| 4 | Country limit | Some ECAs and banks have limits on how much exposure they can have to a single country, and the closer they get the less interested they are in the deal. We use the OECD classification of the country for this. | 0–20 |
| 5 | Need for syndication | This uses the average ticket value to estimate the number of lenders required to do the deal and applies a penalty depending on the number. | 0–20 |
| 6 | Risk of sanctions/FX frictions | USD or EUR carry no penalty. Other currencies will get a penalty depending on the OECD classification of the country. | 0–20 |
| 7 | Long-tenor convexity vs. average maturity risk | This one considers the WAL (weighted average life) of the loan and adds a penalty to long ones. | 0–20 |
| 8 | Claim waiting period / documentation & compliance frictions | A reflection of the speed to process a claim. If the deal is insured and not guaranteed, it can take longer to get the money back. | 0–5 |
| 9 | Construction / pre-CPC risk, local law/security perfection, E&S/reporting | The longer the disbursement, the more risk of cost deviations, issues with suppliers, and frictions with local authorities. | 5 per disbursement year |
| 10 | Prepayment optionality / breakage exposure | Factors like tenor, rating of the borrower and premium reimbursement are contributors to this risk. | 0–10 |
| # | Add-on | Description | Penalty (bps) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lender concentration risk | Sometimes lenders will hold a lot of assets in the same country/industry and there could be less appetite in the market. | 5 |
| 2 | Residual cross-currency/basis and liquidity buffers | This add-on reflects residual funding and hedging costs when the loan currency, the bank’s funding currency and the borrower’s revenue currency are not perfectly aligned. | 5 |
| 3 | Coinsurance/deductibles/interest gaps (effective U slightly > nominal) | ECA cover rarely protects 100% of all amounts at all times; coinsurance, deductibles or interest timing gaps can make the effective uncovered share slightly higher than the nominal percentage. | 10 |
| 4 | Higher internal k and/or r for EM pockets; IFRS-9 volatility buffers | This line approximates additional capital and provisioning costs some banks apply to specific emerging-market portfolios (higher internal capital ratio k, higher return target r, and IFRS-9 volatility overlays). | 5 |